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The Rise of the Divorce, Singles, and Pornography Industries, 1950–2025: Evidence from the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom

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Abstract

This study is a comparative historical analysis of secondary statistical and industry data examining the rise of divorce volumes, one-person households, and three associated commercial sectors—specialized family-law and divorce services, dating and singles platforms, and adult-content markets—in the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom from 1950 to 2025. Primary data collection was not feasible; the analysis relies instead on long-running, publicly available series from national statistical offices (CDC/NCHS, Eurostat, ONS, UN Demographic Yearbook), household panels, labor-force and health surveys (NHANES, NSDUH), and established industry market reports. These secondary sources are widely accepted and routinely used in demographic, economic, and public-health research.

The study documents multi-fold increases in absolute divorce counts, measured post-dissolution reductions in household net worth and income, the expansion of single-person living arrangements, and the co-occurring growth of the three industries from negligible 1950 baselines to multi-billion-dollar annual revenues. It records that women initiate approximately 69 percent of heterosexual divorces and experience larger average income drops, alongside rising prenuptial contracting. Its novelty lies in assembling these trends into a single cross-national frame and in the institutional attribution: the commercialization occurred inside regulatory and fiscal regimes that governments maintained (family-law rules, housing and land-use constraints, taxation of earnings and transfers, and content liberalization), not under free-market conditions. Free-market exchange, i.e., eleuthagorism, requires the absence of such interventions; no known society has operated under those conditions. Residual low-cost procedures in Uganda and Japan illustrate the difference when governmental capture of marriage and divorce is less complete. Information technologies accelerated delivery once the legal framework was in place but did not create the underlying demand or permission. The analysis presents observed outcomes and does not quantify correlations among the three industries or attribute motive to any actor.

Keywords

divorce industry; singles industry; pornography industry; family-law regulation; one-person households; no-fault divorce; prenuptial agreements; post-dissolution wealth; regulatory intervention; secondary data analysis; United States; European Union; United Kingdom; 1950–2025

Chapter 1

Marriage, Divorce, and Family Structure, 1950–2025

This chapter assembles absolute divorce counts and crude rates for the European Union member states, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The figures come from national statistical offices, the United Nations Demographic Yearbook series, Eurostat, and the OECD Family Database. It places those counts beside the timing of no-fault statutes and the parallel decline in marriage rates. Where national sources record the information, it notes the sex of the petitioning spouse.

The recorded rise in divorce after the introduction of no-fault statutes produced large transfers of household wealth. Assets that would otherwise have remained inside the household—real estate, savings, investments, and future earnings—are routinely liquidated or redirected to cover legal fees, court costs, and spousal support. Lawyers and associated professionals receive a substantial share of these funds and pay high marginal tax rates on the resulting income. The net effect is a fiscal transfer from private households into the public sector and the legal system. Both the former husband and the former wife leave the process with reduced net worth; the state and the professionals who administer the process gain. The same process coincides with elevated rates of physical and mental-health diagnoses among the adults involved and with lower intergenerational transfers to their children. Smaller subsequent cohorts are therefore raised with fewer resources and higher recorded rates of the metabolic, ocular, and mental-health conditions documented in later chapters. The combination of wealth destruction, fiscal extraction, and health deterioration is self-reinforcing across generations.

The study examines these recorded outcomes and the statistical and legislative evidence that documents them. It does not treat the presence or absence of intent on the part of the persons who enacted or retained the statutes as a question the available series can resolve. The same sources are used for statutes passed or retained under administrations of differing partisan composition; the study does not select or weight evidence according to the political affiliation of the governments involved. It draws on series that extend across more than thirty years and, where possible, on analyses published before the widespread adoption of linear modeling techniques that later research has applied to family outcomes. Older compilations from statistical offices and international yearbooks record raw counts with fewer intermediate adjustments than many recent papers that embed ideological priors in their specifications.

The published literature on these topics is uneven. Richard Horton, editor of *The Lancet*, wrote in 2015 that "much of the scientific literature, perhaps half, may simply be untrue," citing small sample sizes, tiny effects, invalid exploratory analyses, flagrant conflicts of interest, and an obsession with fashionable trends of dubious importance (Horton 2015). John Ioannidis has documented high rates of non-replication and the influence of bias and flexibility in design on the probability that a research claim is true (Ioannidis 2005). Independent documentation of research-funding patterns has further shown concentration of grants in topic areas that presuppose particular social or ideological conclusions (Gill 2024 and subsequent

compilations). This study therefore prioritizes long-run official statistical series and older compilations that record raw counts with fewer intermediate adjustments, and it treats recent papers that embed strong prior assumptions as supplementary rather than primary evidence.

Legislatures and courts in the jurisdictions under review altered the grounds for divorce between the mid-twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. California enacted the first comprehensive no-fault statute in the United States in 1969; the remaining states followed, with New York adopting the final provision in 2010. England and Wales introduced no-fault divorce in 2020 Act, effective 2022. Several European countries had already permitted divorce on broader grounds by the 1970s, while Italy and Spain retained more restrictive rules until 1970 and 1981 respectively. The absolute number of divorces rose sharply in most of the twenty-nine jurisdictions after these reforms and then stabilized or declined modestly after the early 2000s. Eurostat estimates that the European Union recorded approximately 0.7 million divorces in 2024, corresponding to a crude rate of 1.6 per 1,000 persons. That rate peaked at 2.1 in 2006. The United States recorded roughly 670,000 divorces in recent years, down from higher absolute totals in the 1980s.

Table 1.1 presents absolute divorce counts for selected jurisdictions around 1950 and in the most recent available year. The 1950 figures derive primarily from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1954 and national vital-statistics series; recent figures come from Eurostat, national statistical offices, and CDC compilations.

Table 1.1 Absolute number of divorces, selected jurisdictions, circa 1950 and 2023–2024

Jurisdiction	Divorces circa 1950	Divorces 2023–2024	Notes
United States	385,000 (1950)	~670,000 (recent)	1900 total was 55,751
England and Wales	30,870 (1950)	105,002 (2025, England & Wales)	No-fault effective 2022
Germany	74,638 (West Germany, 1950)	129,337 (2024)	Unified Germany after 1990
France	35,391 (1950)	~120,000–130,000 range (recent estimates)	
Italy	Divorce illegal until 1970	77,364 (2024)	
Spain	Divorce largely unavailable until 1981	82,991 (2024)	
Netherlands	Low thousands (1950)	25,386 (2024)	
Poland	Moderate (1950)	57,463 (2024)	
Sweden	8,008 (1950)	21,672 (2024)	
European Union	Not available as aggregate	~700,000 (2024)	Crude rate 1.6 per

Jurisdiction	Divorces circa 1950	Divorces 2023–2024	Notes
(27)			1,000

Sources: United Nations (1954); United States Census Bureau (various years); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2024); Eurostat (2024); Office for National Statistics (2024).

Table 1.2 summarizes crude divorce rates (divorces per 1,000 persons) for the European Union aggregate and selected large jurisdictions. The rates rose from the 1960s through the early 2000s and have since declined or stabilized in most of the listed countries.

Table 1.2 Crude divorce rates (per 1,000 persons), selected jurisdictions and EU aggregate, selected years

Jurisdiction	~1960–1970	Peak or 2000s	2023–2024
European Union (27)	0.8 (1964)	2.1 (2006)	1.6
United States	~2.2 (1960s)	~5.0 (early 1980s)	~2.5 (recent)
United Kingdom	~0.8–1.0	~2.5–3.0	~1.5 (recent)
Germany	Low	~2.3–2.5	1.5
France	Low	~2.0–2.2	~1.9
Italy	Near zero (pre-1970)	~0.9	1.3–1.4
Spain	Near zero (pre-1981)	~2.8 (2006)	1.7
Netherlands	0.5 (1960)	~2.3	1.4
Sweden	1.2 (1960)	~2.5–2.8	2.1

Sources: United Nations (1954); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2024); Eurostat (2024); Office for National Statistics (2024).

The multi-fold rise in absolute divorce numbers, even where crude rates later stabilized or declined, created a durable commercial base for specialized family-law services. By the early 2020s this base supported annual revenues in the low tens of billions of dollars across the three jurisdictions examined here (detailed in Chapter 5). Parallel growth in one-person households and delayed or non-marriage further expanded markets for dating platforms and adult content, both of which were negligible in 1950.

Marriage rates declined in parallel. Eurostat reports that the crude marriage rate in the European Union fell from 8.0 per 1,000 persons in 1964 to 3.9 in 2024. Fertility rates also fell below replacement in most of

the jurisdictions. National sources that record the sex of the petitioner show that women initiate the majority of divorces in the United States, England and Wales, and several other European countries for which the statistic is published. The absolute rise in divorce after legal liberalization is consistent across the series examined here. Subsequent chapters examine the institutional and fiscal consequences of that rise.

No particular institution or country is singled out or accused of having designed a plan to produce the observed outcomes. The series examined are those published by statistical offices and health agencies in the European Union, the United States, and selected other OECD jurisdictions. Comparable long-run shifts in household size, fertility, and selected health indicators have been recorded in several East and South Asian societies (China, India, Japan, South Korea, and others). The study records the outcomes as they appear in the available series; it does not require or assert coordinated intent on the part of any government or organization. The purpose is to document the joint patterns so that the scale of the recorded changes in household structure, labor-market composition, and health metrics is visible.

Chapter 2

Household Balance Sheets, Fiscal Transparency, and Government Accounts

This chapter assembles the financial balance-sheet aggregates for the household sector and the parallel accounts of general government in the European Union, the euro area, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Eurostat national accounts, the European Central Bank sector accounts, the OECD financial indicators, and national statistical offices supply the figures. The chapter places household net financial assets beside government deficits and gross debt. It records the publication rules under which the aggregates are released and the conditions under which researchers may obtain microdata from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The study examines the recorded outcomes and the statistical evidence that documents them. It does not treat the presence or absence of intent on the part of the persons who designed or retained the fiscal rules as a question the available series can resolve. The same sources are used for accounts compiled under administrations of differing partisan composition; the study does not select or weight evidence according to the political affiliation of the governments involved. The study draws on series that extend across more than thirty years and, where possible, on analyses published before the widespread adoption of linear modeling techniques that later research has applied to household and government accounts. Older compilations from statistical offices record raw aggregates with fewer intermediate adjustments than many recent papers that embed ideological priors in their specifications.

Eurostat records that total financial assets of households in the European Union stood at €42,006 billion in 2025. Liabilities stood at €10,045 billion. Assets therefore equaled 4.2 times liabilities, producing a net financial position of €31,961 billion. Those assets equaled 222.4 percent of GDP while liabilities equaled 53.2 percent, so that net financial assets equaled 169.2 percent of GDP. The European Central Bank sector

accounts show that general government in the euro area recorded net borrowing of several hundred billion euros in recent four-quarter periods while the household sector recorded net lending. Parallel series for the United States from the Federal Reserve Financial Accounts show household net worth substantially larger than household liabilities, while federal debt has risen as a share of GDP over the same decades. National statistical offices publish the aggregates under standard national-accounts rules. Microdata from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey are released to researchers under confidentiality protocols; the protocols limit the release of individual household identifiers and of certain asset details.

Table 2.1 presents the household financial balance sheet for the European Union in 2025 and the corresponding government net-borrowing figures for the euro area in a recent period.

Table 2.1 Household financial assets and liabilities, European Union 2025, and euro-area government net borrowing

Item	Value (€ billion)	Percent of GDP
Household financial assets	42,006	222.4
Household financial liabilities	10,045	53.2
Household net financial assets	31,961	169.2
Ratio of assets to liabilities	4.2	—
Euro-area general government net borrowing (recent four-quarter period)	Several hundred	Approximately 4 percent of net disposable income

Sources: Eurostat (2024); European Central Bank (2024); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024); Office for National Statistics (2024); OECD (2024).

Table 2.2 summarizes the contrast between household net financial positions and general-government gross debt for selected large jurisdictions in recent years. The household figures are net financial assets; the government figures are gross debt under the Maastricht or equivalent definitions.

Table 2.2 Household net financial assets and general-government gross debt, selected jurisdictions, recent years

Jurisdiction	Household net financial assets (% of GDP)	General-government gross debt (% of GDP)
European Union	169	Elevated and rising in most member states
Euro area	Comparable order	Approximately 80–90 range in recent years
United States	Several hundred	Above 100 in recent years

Jurisdiction	Household net financial assets (% of GDP)	General-government gross debt (% of GDP)
United Kingdom	Positive and large	Above 90 in recent years

Sources: Eurostat (2024); European Central Bank (2024); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024); Office for National Statistics (2024).

The aggregates show that the household sector in the jurisdictions examined holds net financial assets several times larger than its liabilities. Parallel government accounts in the same jurisdictions record persistent net borrowing and elevated gross debt. National statistical offices publish the sector aggregates under established national-accounts standards. The conditions under which researchers obtain household-level microdata remain more restrictive than the conditions under which the aggregate accounts are released.

Longitudinal studies document that the transition from married to separated households is associated with large reductions in personal net worth for both spouses. Kapelle (2021), using the German Socio-Economic Panel, records average declines of 82 percent for men and 76 percent for women at separation, driven principally by the loss of housing net worth (92–93 percent). Those reductions are not recovered in subsequent years. U.S. cost surveys place average legal fees for divorces that reach trial above $20,000; uncontested cases average several thousand dollars. Support payments and the liquidation of investment or insurance assets to meet those obligations further reduce the residual stock available for later transfer. Administrative and sibling-comparison studies find that children who experience parental separation record lower adult earnings and elevated rates of certain adverse outcomes relative to siblings with shorter exposure. The series therefore record measurable wealth penalties for both men and women and lower residual resources that can be transmitted to the next generation. Subsequent chapters examine the employment, housing, and health series that accompany these balance-sheet outcomes.

These measured wealth reductions coincide with the professionalization of family-law practice. The same decades that produced the largest post-divorce asset declines also saw the emergence of a multi-billion-dollar divorce-services industry (Chapter 5) and a parallel rise in prenuptial agreements—contracts that function, in effect, as private insurance against the balance-sheet outcomes documented above. Women, who initiate the majority of heterosexual divorces (Chapter 5), experience the larger average income drops after dissolution.

Table 2.3 Measured wealth and cost components associated with marital separation

Component	Measured magnitude	Jurisdiction / source
Personal net-worth decline at separation	76–82 percent	Germany, German Socio-Economic

Component	Measured magnitude	Jurisdiction / source
		Panel (Kapelle 2021)
Housing net-worth decline at separation	92–93 percent	Germany, German Socio-Economic Panel (Kapelle 2021)
Average legal costs, uncontested	$4,000–$11,000	United States, Nolo / Martindale surveys
Average legal costs, contested / trial	$20,000+	United States, Nolo / Martindale surveys
Short-term household-income change (women/children)	Larger negative than for men	United States and Germany, PSID / GSOEP studies

Sources: Kapelle (2021); Nolo (2024); Martindale-Hubbell (2024); National Bureau of Economic Research (various years).

Chapter 3

Labor Markets, Self-Employment, and the Composition of the Taxable Workforce

This chapter assembles labor-force participation rates and self-employment shares by sex for the European Union, the United States, and other OECD jurisdictions. The OECD Family Database, Eurostat Labour Force Survey, ILO modeled estimates, and national statistical offices supply the figures. The chapter places the long-term rise in women's labor-force participation beside the persistent sex difference in self-employment rates and in the share of self-employed persons who employ others. It records the resulting enlargement of the wage-and-salary tax base and the relative contraction of self-employment as a share of total employment. The study examines the recorded outcomes and the statistical evidence that documents them. It does not treat the presence or absence of intent on the part of the persons who designed or retained the labor-market rules as a question the available series can resolve. The same sources are used for series compiled under administrations of differing partisan composition; the study does not select or weight evidence according to the political affiliation of the governments involved. The study draws on series that extend across more than thirty years and, where possible, on analyses published before the widespread adoption of linear modeling techniques that later research has applied to labor-market outcomes. Older compilations from statistical offices record raw counts with fewer intermediate adjustments than many recent papers that embed ideological priors in their specifications.

OECD and national series document a substantial increase in women's labor-force participation from the 1960s onward. Prime-age female participation in the United States rose from the mid-50 percent range in the mid-1970s to approximately 78 percent in recent years; the OECD average for the same age group rose

from the low-50 percent range to above 80 percent. Parallel data show that men remain more likely than women to be self-employed. In most OECD countries women account for roughly one-quarter to one-third of self-employment activity and a still smaller share of employer businesses. The Missing Entrepreneurs reports from the OECD and the European Commission record that self-employed women are less likely than self-employed men to have employees in nearly all EU member states. The share of total employment accounted for by self-employment has declined in the majority of the jurisdictions examined, enlarging the wage-and-salary component of the tax base.

Table 3.1 presents female labor-force participation rates for selected jurisdictions at selected points from the 1970s to the most recent available year.

Table 3.1 Female labor-force participation rates, selected jurisdictions, selected years

Jurisdiction	Mid-1970s	~1990	Recent year
United States (prime-age)	~57	~74	~78
OECD average (prime-age)	~52	~65	~82
European Union (aggregate, ages 15–64)	Lower	Rising	Near or above 70 in several member states
United Kingdom	Rising from lower base	~67	Above 75

Sources: SOECD (2024); Economic Policy Institute (2026); Our World in Data (2026); Eurostat (2024).

Table 3.2 summarizes self-employment rates by sex and the share of the self-employed who are employers for the European Union and selected large jurisdictions in recent years.

Table 3.2 Self-employment rates by sex and share of self-employed who are employers, selected jurisdictions, recent years

Jurisdiction	Male self-employment rate (% of male employment)	Female self-employment rate (% of female employment)	Share of self-employed women who are employers
OECD average	~18–19	~13–14	Lower than for men
European Union	Higher than female	Lower than male	Fewer than one-quarter in most member states
United States	Low single digits overall	Lower than male	Smaller share of employer businesses
Germany	Moderate	Lower	Among higher shares in

Jurisdiction	Male self-employment rate (% of male employment)	Female self-employment rate (% of female employment)	Share of self-employed women who are employers
			the EU

Sources: OECD (2019); OECD (2023); Eurostat (2024); International Labour Organization (2024); OECD (2024).

National statistical offices and international compilations document a substantial rise in the female share of tertiary enrollment and of degrees awarded. In the United States, women now earn the majority of bachelor's degrees overall and approximately half of research doctorates. The distribution across fields is sharply uneven. Women account for the large majority of degrees in education, psychology, and the social sciences and humanities; men account for the large majority of degrees in engineering, computer science, and mathematics. NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates data for recent years show women receiving more than 50 percent of social-science doctorates while remaining below 30 percent in most engineering subfields. OECD compilations for the European Union and member states record the same pattern: women constitute roughly two-thirds of graduates in social sciences, journalism, and information and more than three-quarters of graduates in education, while they constitute roughly one-quarter of graduates in engineering, manufacturing, and construction.

Parallel occupational series show that women remain a small minority in construction and extraction trades. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Institute for Women's Policy Research figures place the female share of U.S. construction-trade workers at approximately 4.3 percent in recent years. Shares for carpenters, electricians, and plumbers fall between 3 and 3.5 percent. European series record comparable underrepresentation. Vocational-qualification and apprenticeship data confirm that women constitute a small share of entrants into labor and machinery-related programs. The resulting mismatch appears in the labor market as an oversupply of graduates in female-dominated fields relative to available positions and a persistent shortage of workers in male-dominated trades.

The same period that produced higher female labor-force participation and educational attainment in selected fields also produced the commercial infrastructure of the singles and pornography industries (Chapter 5).

Whether these labor-market shifts were cause, consequence, or co-occurrence with the rise of one-person households and delayed marriage is not settled by the aggregate data; what is observable is that the resulting demand for dating platforms and adult content scaled from near-zero in 1950 to multi-billion-dollar markets by 2025.

Table 3.3 Female share of tertiary graduates by selected field and female share of selected construction trades, recent years

Field or occupation	Female share (approx.)	Jurisdiction / source
Social sciences, journalism, information (tertiary graduates)	~65–70	OECD / NCES, ~2020
Education (tertiary graduates)	~75–80	OECD / NCES, ~2020
Engineering, manufacturing, construction (tertiary graduates)	~25–30	OECD / NCES, ~2020
Social-science research doctorates	>50	NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates, recent year
Engineering doctorates (most subfields)	<30	NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates, recent year
Construction-trade workers (U.S.)	~4.3	BLS / IWPR, 2025
Electricians, carpenters, plumbers (U.S.)	3–3.5	BLS / IWPR, 2025

Sources: OECD (2022); National Center for Education Statistics (2022); National Science Foundation (2024); Bureau of Labor Statistics (2025); Institute for Women's Policy Research (2025); Eurostat (2024).

The series record a long-term rise in women's labor-force participation that has enlarged the wage-and-salary tax base. Men continue to account for the larger share of self-employment and of employer businesses. The relative contraction of self-employment as a share of total employment appears in the majority of the jurisdictions examined. The same sources document that the female share of tertiary graduates has risen sharply and is now concentrated in social-science, education, and health fields, while the female share of engineering, construction, and skilled-trade occupations remains low. Subsequent chapters examine the housing-demand, industry, and health series that accompany these labor-market outcomes.

Chapter 4

Household Size, Single-Person Living, Housing Demand, and Dietary and Substance Trends

This chapter assembles data on household composition, the share of one-person households, the demographic profile of recent home buyers, and the parallel series on ultra-processed food consumption, alcohol use, cannabis use, gym and supplement expenditure, myopia prevalence, mental-health treatment and disability rates, and selected metabolic and musculoskeletal outcomes for the European Union, the United States, and selected other OECD jurisdictions. Eurostat household statistics, United Nations

compilations, the U.S. Census Bureau, the National Association of Realtors, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), Health & Fitness Association reports, market analyses of dietary-supplement sales, and national vital-statistics and ophthalmologic series supply the figures. The chapter places the long-term rise in one-person households beside the increasing share of single buyers and the documented shifts toward higher shares of ultra-processed foods and rising or converging rates of alcohol and cannabis use. The expansion of one-person households documented here is the demographic substrate of the singles and pornography industries whose revenue growth is estimated in Chapter 5. Dating-app and adult-content markets were effectively nonexistent in 1950; by the mid-2020s they generated several billion dollars annually in the United States alone, with substantial additional volume in the EU and UK. Further, and directly related to the rise of single households, the study records the resulting increase in the number of housing units required to house a given population and the concentration of that demand in urban areas, together with the measured consumption patterns that accompany smaller household size and the accompanying changes in obesity, diabetes, substance-related mortality, myopia, and mental-health service use.

The study examines the recorded outcomes and the statistical evidence that documents them. It does not treat the presence or absence of intent on the part of the persons who designed or retained the relevant family-law, housing, or food-marketing rules as a question the available series can resolve. The same sources are used for series compiled under administrations of differing partisan composition; the study does not select or weight evidence according to the political affiliation of the governments involved. The study draws on series that extend across more than thirty years and, where possible, on analyses published before the widespread adoption of linear modeling techniques that later research has applied to household and dietary outcomes. Older compilations from statistical offices record raw counts with fewer intermediate adjustments than many recent papers that embed ideological priors in their specifications.

Eurostat and national statistical offices document a substantial increase in the share of one-person households. In the European Union, single-adult households without children numbered approximately 75 million in 2024 and constituted the largest single household category. Their number grew 16.9 percent between 2015 and 2024, nearly three times the growth rate of all households. In several northern and western European countries the share of one-person households exceeds 35 percent. In the United States the share of households consisting of one person rose from approximately 13 percent in 1960 to roughly 29 percent in recent years. Parallel data from the National Association of Realtors show that single women accounted for 21 percent of recent U.S. home buyers and single men for 9 percent; married couples accounted for 61 percent. The share of buyers with children under 18 fell to 24 percent, the lowest level recorded in the series.

Table 4.1 presents the share of one-person households for selected jurisdictions in recent years.

Table 4.1 Share of one-person households, selected jurisdictions, recent years

Jurisdiction	Share of one-person households (%)	Approximate year
Finland	41	2024
Norway	40	2024
Germany	37	2024
United Kingdom	29.5	2024
United States	~29	recent
European Union (single-adult households without children)	Largest category (75 million)	2024

Sources: Eurostat (2024); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2024); Office for National Statistics (2024); U.S. Census Bureau (various years).

Table 4.2 summarizes the composition of recent home buyers in the United States.

Table 4.2 Composition of recent home buyers, United States, 2025 Profile

Buyer category	Share of all buyers (%)
Married couples	61
Single women	21
Single men	9
Buyers with children under 18	24
First-time buyers	21

Sources: National Association of Realtors (2025).

CDC and NHANES series document that ultra-processed foods account for more than half of caloric intake among U.S. adults and a higher share among youth. Systematic reviews of nationally representative samples across multiple countries associate higher ultra-processed food intake with younger age, urban residence, and being unmarried, single, separated, or divorced. National alcohol surveys record a narrowing of the historical sex gap in consumption; in several adult age groups the increase in past-year use and binge drinking has been larger among women than among men. Cannabis-use surveys in the United States and Europe record rising overall prevalence and a narrowing of the sex gap; in some young-adult cohorts women now report higher past-month use than men. These consumption patterns coexist with the marketing of low-fat, vegetarian, and vegan products as health-oriented alternatives. These health trends co-occur with the commercial growth of industries that monetize single living (Chapter 5) and with

the measured post-divorce income and wealth patterns that have accompanied rising rates of prenuptial contracting and inter-sex distrust.

Table 4.3 summarizes selected consumption, expenditure, and health indicators.

Table 4.3 Selected dietary, substance-use, expenditure, and health indicators, recent years

Indicator	Approximate value or change	Jurisdiction / source
Calories from ultra-processed foods (adults)	~53–55 %	United States, CDC/NHANES 2021–2023
Higher ultra-processed food intake associated with	Unmarried / single / divorced status, younger age, urban	Multi-country systematic review
Adult obesity prevalence	~13 % (1960–1962) to 40.3 % (2021–2023)	United States, NCHS
Adult diabetes (total, age-adjusted)	~9.7 % (1999–2000) to 14.3 % (2021–2023)	United States, CDC/NCHS
Past-year cannabis use (females aged 12+)	~19.8 % (2022–2023)	United States, NSDUH
Past-year cannabis use (males aged 12+)	~24.1 % (2022–2023)	United States, NSDUH
Alcohol-induced death rate increase (women aged 25–34)	255 % (1999–2024)	United States, CDC vital statistics
Alcohol-induced death rate increase (men aged 25–34)	188 % (1999–2024)	United States, CDC vital statistics
U.S. gym/fitness facility membership	81 million (2025); ~26 % of population aged 6+	Health & Fitness Association
U.S. dietary-supplements market size	~$69 billion (2025)	Grand View Research / market reports
Myopia prevalence (U.S. adults 12–54)	~25 % (early 1970s) to ~42 % (1999–2004)	NHANES / Vitale et al.
Women receiving mental-health services (past 12 months)	~29 %	KFF / national surveys
Any mental illness prevalence (U.S. women)	~26–27 %	NAMI / NSDUH-derived estimates

Sources: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2024, 2025); National Center for Health Statistics (2024); Dicken et al. (2023); Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2024); National Survey on Drug Use and Health (2022–2023); PLOS Global Public Health analysis of CDC data (2025);

Health & Fitness Association (2025/2026); Grand View Research (2025); Vitale et al. (2009); Kaiser Family Foundation (2025); National Alliance on Mental Illness (various years).

The series record a long-term rise in one-person households that has increased the number of housing units required to accommodate a given population. Single women constitute a larger share of recent U.S. home buyers than single men. The share of buyers with children under 18 has fallen to a historic low. Parallel series document high and, in some periods, rising shares of ultra-processed food together with converging or rising rates of alcohol and cannabis use, particularly among women in selected age groups. Adult obesity prevalence in the United States rose from approximately 13 percent in 1960–1962 to 40.3 percent in 2021–2023. Age-adjusted total diabetes prevalence rose from approximately 9.7 percent in 1999–2000 to 14.3 percent in 2021–2023. Alcohol-induced death rates among women aged 25–34 increased 255 percent between 1999 and 2024, a larger relative rise than the 188 percent increase among men of the same age. Past-year cannabis use among females aged 12 and older reached approximately 19.8 percent in 2022–2023, with the sex gap narrowing and, in some young-adult cohorts, reversing.

U.S. fitness-facility membership reached a recorded 81 million in 2025 (approximately 26 percent of the population aged 6 and older). The U.S. dietary-supplements market is estimated at roughly $69 billion in 2025. Myopia prevalence among U.S. adults aged 12–54 rose from approximately 25 percent in the early 1970s to approximately 42 percent by 1999–2004; longer-run European cohort data show further generational increases. Approximately 29 percent of U.S. women aged 18–64 report receiving mental-health services in the past 12 months; any-mental-illness prevalence among U.S. women is estimated near 26–27 percent. Sarcopenia (age-related loss of muscle mass and function) shows rising prevalence in multiple national surveys of older adults, with rates commonly in the 5–15 percent range depending on definition and population.

Claims that plant-based or low-fat patterns confer net health advantages rest on studies whose modeling choices and funding sources have been subject to detailed critique (Teicholz 2014; Bikman 2020; Kämmerer and colleagues 2020, 2021). Pottenger's multi-generation cat feeding experiments recorded poorer outcomes on heat-processed diets relative to raw-meat diets, which is highly relevant to human digestion due to human pH levels, gall and lack of fermenting chambers; subsequent work has linked part of the observed difference to heat-labile factors such as taurine. Human gastric pH is low (typically 1.5–3.5 in the fasting and postprandial state), consistent with efficient protein digestion and the denaturation of dietary proteins (Guyton and Hall 2016; Marieb and Hoehn 2019). Humans lack the specialized foregut or hindgut fermentation chambers (rumen, reticulum, or enlarged cecum) found in true herbivores, which limits the microbial extraction of energy and certain nutrients from plant cell walls (Stevens and Hume 1995; Karasov and Douglas 2013). Archaeological and ethnographic records show that meat and animal foods formed a substantial component of many historical human diets.

A clear set of paradoxes is evident in the recorded patterns. Households and individuals spend substantial sums on products marketed as healthy (low-fat, plant-based, and "functional" foods), gym memberships,

exercise equipment, and nutritional supplements. At the same time, leisure activities centered on alcohol consumption and ultra-processed or junk-food intake remain common. Animal foods in a carnivore-pattern diet supply protein, amino acids, creatine, and multiple minerals in ratios that match physiological requirements without the additional expenditure on isolated supplements. The measured shifts toward higher shares of ultra-processed foods, low-fat and plant-based products, and the parallel rises or convergences in alcohol and cannabis use coincide with long-term increases in diabetes, obesity, muscle loss, immune-related conditions, shortsightedness and other vision impairments, and mental-health diagnoses and treatment-seeking. These outcomes appear in both national health statistics and clinical series and track the movement away from larger household and family structures toward single-person and urban living arrangements. The concentration of single-person households and the higher share of single female home buyers in urban areas place a larger fraction of adults and children under the direct reach of food, beverage, and lifestyle marketing that promotes the same patterns. The resulting composition of the adult and child populations in those areas records elevated rates of the metabolic, musculoskeletal, immune, ocular, and mental-health conditions listed above. The measured consumption shifts and the documented associations with household type remain independent of the contested long-term comparative claims about pure plant-based versus animal-based patterns. Subsequent chapters examine the industry series that accompany these household, housing, and consumption outcomes.

Chapter 5

The Divorce, Singles, and Pornography Industries

No comprehensive public accounting exists of the total private wealth transferred or destroyed through divorce proceedings in the European Union or the United Kingdom (Eurostat; Office for National Statistics; national statistical offices). National statistical offices publish counts of divorces and, in some cases, limited data on spousal support or property settlements, but they do not release aggregate figures for legal fees, asset liquidations, or the cumulative reduction in household net worth attributable to these processes (Eurostat 2024; ONS various years). The same gap exists for the volume of intergenerational transfers that fail to occur because assets are sold, taxes are paid on the resulting transactions, and remaining resources are divided. Inheritance taxes are recorded; the larger private destruction of capital inside dissolving households is not (OECD Inheritance Tax reports; national tax authorities). It is therefore reasonable to treat divorce-related transfers as a second major channel, after inheritance taxation, through which private wealth is prevented from passing to the next generation, even if the exact magnitude cannot be measured from available series.

The number of men who reduce labor-market effort or exit high-earning occupations after large support or property awards is likewise unrecorded (OECD Labour Force Statistics; national employment surveys). The number of children who receive little or no inheritance because parental assets were liquidated or redirected is unrecorded (German Socio-Economic Panel studies; NBER sibling-comparison work). The

scale of psychological and material harm experienced by children whose households dissolve is unrecorded in any systematic cross-national series (OECD Family Database; national child-welfare statistics). Official statistics and media coverage of these outcomes remain limited relative to the volume of commentary that frames family dissolution primarily as a matter of adult autonomy. The fallout appears in the health, fertility, and wealth series already assembled; its precise allocation across individuals is not published.

If the claim that men function as net extractors of value from women holds, then women who avoid marriage and adopt higher-partner sexual strategies should record higher net worth, higher life satisfaction, and lower rates of physical and mental-health diagnoses than women who marry and remain married (Eurostat income and living conditions; OECD better-life indicators). Available series do not show this pattern. Women in single-person households and in post-divorce statuses show elevated rates of certain mental-health service use and, in some cohorts, higher or converging rates of substance use (Eurostat; CDC National Health Interview Survey). Aggregate birth rates have fallen while divorce counts rose; neither fertility nor measured health metrics have improved in the same period (Eurostat fertility statistics; OECD Family Database). Production and private capital formation have not risen in proportion to the growth of public debt and government spending, which inflate recorded GDP (Eurostat national accounts; OECD Economic Outlook). The share of households able to purchase housing has declined in major urban markets even as the number of one-person households has increased (Eurostat household statistics; National Association of Realtors).

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control data for 2024 show gonorrhea notifications at 106,331 cases, a 303 percent increase since 2015, and syphilis notifications at 45,577 cases, more than double the 2015 level; congenital syphilis cases nearly doubled from 78 to 140 in a single year across reporting countries (ECDC 2024, 2026). New HIV infections have declined globally since 2010, but they have risen in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; in Western and Central Europe and North America the absolute numbers remain elevated relative to earlier decades even as treatment coverage has improved (UNAIDS 2026). Genital herpes caused by HSV-1 accounts for a rising share of first-episode genital infections in Europe and the United States, even as overall HSV-1 childhood exposure has fallen in some high-income settings (WHO estimates; European clinical series). HPV remains the most common sexually transmitted viral infection; prevalence is high among sexually active young adults, and awareness of its transmission routes is incomplete in population surveys (CDC; European HPV surveillance). These bacterial and viral series track the same period of rising partner numbers and declining stable partnership rates.

Mental-health series show the largest recent increases among women of childbearing age. Age-standardized incidence and prevalence of depressive disorders among women aged 15–49 rose globally from 1990 to 2021, with sharper rises after 2019 in high-income regions (Global Burden of Disease Study 2021). In the United States, anxiety diagnoses among young adults rose from 17.9 percent in 2020 to 23.4 percent in 2024, with women reporting substantially higher rates than men; daily anxiety and medication

use also increased (George Mason University analysis of national survey data). Longitudinal Swedish data show that clinically significant mental-health problems among lower-secondary-school girls roughly tripled between 2007–08 and 2024–25 (Lund University). These patterns appear in the same age bands and household types that record the highest shares of one-person living and elevated rates of certain substance-use indicators.

Three commercial sectors expanded in parallel with these demographic shifts. Online gambling participation among internet users aged 16 and older reaches 19.6 percent in the United Kingdom and 13.2 percent in Germany according to the GWI survey data published in the DataReportal Digital 2026 Global Overview Report; the majority of participants in most markets are male. OnlyFans recorded approximately $7.84 billion in gross fan payments in the year to 30 November 2025, of which roughly $6.3 billion was paid to creators; the platform reports approximately 5 million creator accounts, the large majority of which are held by women (Fenix International accounts). Dividing total payouts by the number of accounts produces a mean of roughly $1,200–1,250 per account per year. The distribution is highly concentrated: OnlyFans has stated that 5,076 creators have earned at least $1 million since launch, a share on the order of 0.1 percent of accounts. Independent analyses of scraped or reported data consistently find that the median lies far below the mean, with a large share of accounts earning little or nothing (platform accounts; industry compilations). The same concentration appears on Instagram, where public self-presentation is common. While a small number of women generate substantial income from either platform and may report satisfaction with that income, the majority of participants generate little or no revenue while posting personal images and information. Longitudinal and experimental studies link higher volumes of public self-disclosure and upward social comparison on Instagram to elevated relationship stress, lower intimacy scores in some dyadic samples, and higher depressive and anxiety symptoms (meta-analyses of social-media self-disclosure; Instagram-specific well-being studies). These patterns coincide with the measured decline in multi-person household formation and the rise in single-person living documented earlier.

Table 5.1 summarizes selected indicators of these industry and health series.

Table 5.1 Selected indicators of online gambling, pornography platforms, sexually transmitted infections, mental health, and one-person households

Indicator	Approximate value	Jurisdiction / source
Online gambling participation (internet users 16+, previous month)	19.6 %	United Kingdom, GWI / DataReportal Digital 2026
Online gambling participation (internet users 16+, previous month)	13.2 %	Germany, GWI / DataReportal Digital 2026

Indicator	Approximate value	Jurisdiction / source
OnlyFans gross fan payments	$7.84 billion	Year to 30 Nov 2025, Fenix International accounts
OnlyFans mean payout per creator account	~$1,200–1,250 per year	Calculated from Fenix International accounts
OnlyFans creators earning ≥ $1 million (lifetime)	5,076 (~0.1 % of accounts)	OnlyFans statement, August 2026
Gonorrhea notifications	106,331 (+303 % since 2015)	EU/EEA, ECDC 2024
Syphilis notifications	45,577 (more than double since 2015)	EU/EEA, ECDC 2024
Congenital syphilis cases	140 (nearly double prior year)	Reporting EU/EEA countries, ECDC 2024
New HIV infections (Western & Central Europe / North America)	Elevated relative to earlier decades	UNAIDS 2026
Anxiety diagnosis rate, young adult women (US)	Substantially higher than men; overall young-adult rate 23.4 % in 2024	National survey data, George Mason analysis
One-person household share	~41 %	Finland, national / UN compilations
One-person household share	~37 %	Germany, national / UN compilations

Sources: DataReportal (2026); Fenix International Limited (2026); European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2024, 2026); UNAIDS (2026); Global Burden of Disease Study (2021); George Mason University analysis of U.S. survey data (2026); Lund University longitudinal study (2026); Eurostat and national statistical offices (various years); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (various years).

The expansion of these three industries coincided with the household and health series documented earlier. Legal and related costs extract resources from dissolving households; the recipients pay high marginal tax rates on the resulting income. Single-person living concentrates housing demand in urban areas and is associated with higher shares of ultra-processed food and elevated rates of certain metabolic and mental-health conditions. Pornography consumption and creator participation on platforms such as OnlyFans increased; online gambling participation rose, predominantly among men. Sexually transmitted infection notifications reached multi-decade highs for several bacterial infections, with parallel elevations or shifting etiology for viral infections. Mental-health diagnoses rose most sharply among women of childbearing age. These patterns are consistent with a movement of adults out of multi-person households

and into urban single living, with measurable declines in private capital formation, fertility, and selected health metrics, and with growth in public debt and government spending that raises recorded GDP. Neither regulatory expansions favored by some conservative parties nor the existing framework of family-law and commercial rules reverse the joint outcomes. The recorded series show losses for men, women, and, on the available intergenerational indicators, their children.

Women initiate the large majority of heterosexual divorces. In U.S. samples, women sought the end of the marriage in approximately 69 percent of cases; in England and Wales the female share of sole divorce applications has remained above 60 percent in recent years (Rosenfeld 2018; Office for National Statistics). At the same time, household income falls for both sexes after divorce, and the decline is larger on average for women (roughly 50 percent versus roughly 30 percent for men in recent U.K. and U.S. analyses). Women remain the large majority of alimony recipients (approximately 96 percent), yet many still record net financial deterioration after support and asset division (Legal & General 2025; Smock et al.). Prenuptial agreements have risen sharply, particularly among younger adults. Recent U.S. polling shows that more than half of engaged or married adults under age 45 report having one, up from low-single-digit percentages a decade earlier (Harris Poll / Bloomberg 2026).

It cannot be established from the available series that a measurable share of women have adopted the view that it is ethical to enter marriage primarily in order to extract assets on exit. No systematic survey of motives supports that specific claim. What the series do record is an increase in men (and, in some samples, women) seeking contractual protection of assets before marriage. The joint pattern—women filing the majority of divorce petitions, larger average post-divorce income declines for women, and a clear rise in prenuptial agreements—documents heightened financial caution by prospective spouses, especially men, under current family-law rules. That caution is consistent with a measurable increase in distrust between the sexes regarding long-term partnership and asset exposure. Whether or not any particular motive can be proven, the recorded outcomes show a deepening mutual risk that reduces the formation and stability of multi-person households and is not compatible with sustained high rates of marriage and fertility.

Estimated annual industry revenues (nominal USD), ~1950 vs ~2025, with growth

These are realistic order-of-magnitude estimates using available proxies (family-law/divorce legal services for the "divorce industry"; online dating apps/services for the "singles industry"; adult-content/pornography revenues for the "pornography industry").

Exact 1950 figures for specialized commercial industries are sparse or effectively near-zero outside limited magazines/underground markets; 2025 figures draw from IBISWorld, industry reports, Eurostat/ONS/CDC-aligned divorce volumes, and widely cited adult-entertainment estimates. All figures are nominal (not inflation-adjusted). U.S. CPI rose roughly 13× from 1950 to 2025, so real growth is still very large but lower than the nominal percentages shown. Definitions vary by source; related services (counseling, housing, etc.) are only partially captured.

Table 5.2 Growth Estimates of Divorce, Singles and Pornography Industries

Industry	Region	~1950 estimate	~2025 estimate	Estimated growth (%)	Notes / proxies
Divorce / family-law services	USA	~$0.3 billion	~$13 billion	~4,200%	1950: ~385,000 divorces, limited specialized legal market. 2025: IBISWorld family law & divorce lawyers ~$13.1B. Broader "divorce industry" estimates sometimes reach $50B+ including related services.
	EU (approx.)	~$0.2 billion	~$6–7 billion	~3,000–3,500%	1950: low volumes, many countries restricted divorce. 2025: family-law / divorce-services regional estimates ~$6.75B (one market report); Eurostat ~0.7 million divorces in 2024.
	UK	~$0.05 billion	~$2.8 billion	~5,500%	1950: ~30,870 divorces (England & Wales). 2025: UK family-law market ~£2.2B (~$2.8B).
Singles / online dating	USA	~$0 (negligible)	~$3.5–4 billion	>10,000% (effectively from near-zero)	1950: personal ads and informal matchmaking only. 2025: U.S. online-dating market commonly estimated $3–4B range (Match Group and peers dominate).
	EU (approx.)	~$0	~$2.5–3 billion	>10,000%	1950: negligible commercial market. 2025: European online-dating market ~$2.5–3B in recent reports.
	UK	~$0	~$0.5–0.7 billion	>10,000%	Portion of European market; 1950 baseline effectively zero.
Pornography / adult content	USA	~$0.05–0.1 billion	~$13 billion	~13,000–26,000%	1950: limited girlie magazines, underground material (Playboy launched 1953). 2025: one widely cited figure for U.S. porn industry ~$13B; broader adult entertainment higher.
	EU (approx.)	~$0.02–0.05 billion	~$20–30 billion (share of global)	>50,000%	1950: small local magazine/film markets. 2025: Europe holds a substantial share of the ~$100B global adult-entertainment estimates; OnlyFans UK+Europe GMV alone in

Industry	Region	~1950 estimate	~2025 estimate	Estimated growth (%)	Notes / proxies
					the low billions.
	UK	~$0.01 billion	~$2–4 billion (share)	>20,000%	1950: limited. 2025: meaningful share of European adult market plus OnlyFans activity.

Sources:

IBISWorld (U.S. family law & divorce lawyers, ~2025); UK Family Law Market reports (~£2.2B); Eurostat (EU divorces ~0.7 million in 2024); CDC/NCHS and historical vital statistics (U.S. divorces ~385,000 in 1950); ONS (England & Wales divorces 1950 and recent years); industry compilations for online dating (Statista, Grand View Research, company filings); widely circulated adult-industry revenue estimates (~$100B global, with U.S. subset figures) and OnlyFans parent-company filings.

Caveats:

1950 baselines for the singles and pornography industries are effectively near zero as commercialized, scalable markets; growth percentages therefore reflect the emergence of large industries from negligible starting points. Inflation adjustment would reduce nominal growth rates substantially (U.S. dollar purchasing power roughly 1/13th of 1950 levels). Cross-national legal, tax, and reporting differences, plus incomplete capture of informal or related services, limit precision. Figures are best treated as indicative of order-of-magnitude expansion rather than exact accounting.

Chapter 6

Synthesis and Institutional Attribution, 1950–2025

Chapters 1–5 record the multi-fold rise in absolute divorce volumes, the measured post-dissolution reductions in household net worth and income (larger on average for women), the expansion of one-person households and single-buyer housing demand, the accompanying shifts in ultra-processed food consumption and substance use, and the co-occurring growth of three commercial sectors whose 1950 baselines were negligible: specialized family-law and divorce services, dating and singles platforms, and adult-content markets. Women initiate approximately 69 percent of heterosexual divorces; prenuptial agreements have increased; and the combination is consistent with greater male caution and with the inter-sex distrust patterns noted earlier. Related STI burdens, gambling revenues, and creator-platform volumes further track the same period. These are observed outcomes drawn from vital statistics, household panels, labor-force and consumption surveys, and industry reports. The recorded expansion constitutes, on the evidence presented, a substantial alteration in the scale and organization of family life relative to 1950. The scale of the three industries is a clear indication of societal decay, if not even destruction, but not evidence

of free-market or capitalist processes, as so often claimed (e.g., Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971; Becker, 1981). Whether that alteration is characterized as decay or destruction is an interpretive judgment that rests on the observed outcomes rather than on any attribution of motive to legislators, judges, or private actors. The study maintains its restriction to recorded results: it does not claim that the regulatory framework was designed to produce these industries, only that the industries expanded inside the framework governments maintained and that residual low-cost procedures (Uganda, Japan, see below) illustrate the difference when that framework is less comprehensive.

Free-market exchange, meaning eleuthagorism, and the capitalism that is its theoretical expression, requires the absence of governmental interference in voluntary transactions: no labor-market regulations, no taxation of earnings or transfers, and no state monopoly on legal tender (Kayser, 2026). No known society or economy has ever operated under those conditions (Hoppe, 2015). The institutional setting that actually existed was one of continuous regulatory intervention in family law (grounds for dissolution, custody presumptions, support obligations), in housing and land-use rules that raise the cost of multi-person living, in taxation and transfer systems that alter the relative returns to marriage versus single status, and in the monetary and financial framework that shapes all market prices. Under those rules the commercial sectors organized around divorce, single living, and adult content expanded from near-zero baselines to multi-billion-dollar annual revenues. Only governments possess the legal authority to impose the relevant interventions; the recorded expansion is therefore attributable to the regulatory framework, not to men as a class, women as a class, traditions, religions, or philosophies.

Divorce was historically a matter resolved between the spouses and their families. Once legislatures and courts assumed exclusive authority over both the formation and the dissolution of marriage, the process was transformed into a regulated service. In contemporary Uganda, Islamic divorces continue to be effected by a simple written declaration registered with local authorities; no extensive adversarial proceedings or professional fees are required. In Japan, childless couples without joint debt or significant property may still dissolve a marriage by mutual agreement through a single administrative filing that changes family status, without mandatory judicial intervention or lawyer involvement. These residual low-cost procedures illustrate the institutional difference: where government capture of the marriage-and-divorce function is incomplete, the commercial apparatus remains limited.

The singles industry is tightly linked to the same regulatory shift. Policies that lower the relative cost of exiting marriage, raise the cost of multi-person housing, and expand individual tax filing and benefit eligibility enlarge the pool of one-person households. Governments that collect more revenue from individual earners and transfer recipients than from intact households have an observable fiscal interest in the resulting demographic pattern; the commercial dating and singles platforms that serve that pattern expanded inside this fiscal and legal setting.

The regulatory impact is most visible in pornography. For most of the period under review it remained a private, often legally restricted or socially sanctioned activity whose commercial scale was constrained by

obscenity statutes and enforcement. Liberalization of content rules, combined with the tax treatment of the resulting enterprises, converted the same activity into a multi-billion-dollar industry that generates measurable tax revenue in the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. The transition from restricted private consumption to taxed commercial production tracks changes in legal permission and fiscal incorporation rather than the mere existence of demand.

The three jurisdictions do not share identical regulatory timelines or contents, and these differences qualify any uniform attribution. In the United States, no-fault divorce spread state by state after California's 1969 statute, with most states adopting some form by the mid-1980s; alimony remained taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payer until the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reversed that treatment for new agreements. In England and Wales, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 (effective 1971) introduced separation-based grounds, later expanded by the 2020 no-fault regime, effective 2022; financial-remedy rules and housing costs have long interacted with means-tested benefits that treat single adults differently from couples. Across the European Union, divorce liberalization occurred later in several member states (Italy 1970, Spain 1981, Ireland 1996, Malta 2011), while alimony tax treatment and family-benefit design continue to vary by national code. Housing and land-use regulation, which raise the relative cost of larger dwellings, also differ in stringency and timing.

These staggered reforms coincide with the acceleration of absolute divorce volumes and the subsequent commercialization of family-law services, yet the commercial scale of dating platforms and adult content expanded most rapidly after broadband diffusion in all three jurisdictions, regardless of the precise year of no-fault adoption. The pattern is therefore consistent with regulatory enablement but not with a single statutory trigger. A tighter jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction alignment of reform dates against industry-revenue series would further test whether differences in alimony taxation, benefit eligibility for single adults, or housing constraints produce measurable differences in the pace of commercialization; the aggregate data assembled here do not yet perform that test.

The three industries are intertwined. Larger numbers of single-person households coincide with higher volumes of adult content and with higher absolute numbers of divorces. The logical direction runs from the expansion of one-person living arrangements to increased demand for both pornography and for the legal and commercial services that accompany marital dissolution. The reverse pathways—from higher pornography consumption or higher divorce volumes back to further growth in single households—are equally consistent with the observed co-movement. This study records the parallel expansion but does not attempt to measure or specify the correlations among the three industries.

Information technologies accelerated the delivery and scale of dating platforms and adult content once the underlying legal and fiscal conditions were in place. They did not create the demand or the permissible supply. Comparable commercial activity remained marginal in 1950, when the same technologies were absent but the regulatory apparatus was already developing. The subsequent growth tracks changes in

statutes, court practice, tax treatment, and housing regulation more closely than the mere availability of computers or broadband.

Limitations remain. Aggregate data do not isolate every marginal effect of a particular statute. Informal arrangements and non-commercial substitutes are incompletely measured. Industry definitions and 1950 baselines rest on sparse commercial records. Inflation and differences in legal regimes qualify direct cross-national comparisons. These constraints affect the precision of magnitude estimates; they do not alter the institutional fact that the observed expansion occurred inside a regulatory order rather than outside it. The evidence is presented as recorded outcomes under the legal and fiscal conditions that governments maintained.

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Health & Fitness Association reports, dietary-supplement market analyses, ophthalmologic series, and national STI surveillance data (HIV, herpes, HPV) are drawn from the respective national statistical and public-health agencies for the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union member states.

All figures remain subject to the definitional, inflation, and coverage limitations stated in the chapters.